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Digital Fascism 
Challenges for the Open Society in Times of Social Media 
 
MAIK FIELITZ & HOLGER MARCKS 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Germany 
 
This paper takes up the assumption that social media offers a beneficial terrain for 
the far right to undermine open societies. Identifying perceptions of imperilment as 
the central impetus for the far right to justify illiberal politics, it analyzes how such 
perceptions are boosted under the digital condition. This contextualization is essential 
for our understanding of digital fascism: a highly fluid and ambivalent variant of 
fascism that lacks a clear organizational center as the digitally networked masses are 
the engine of their own manipulation. To substantiate this concept, we relate 
structures of social media to far-right agency in social media. Concretely, we show 
how the techniques of dramatic storytelling, gaslighting and metric manipulation 
correspond with the functioning of social media that catalyzes the amplification of 
fears, the diffusion of post-truth and the logic of numbers. Based on this, we argue 
that a new perspective on fascism is needed, since digital fascism draws its dynamics 
mainly from digital (hate) cultures and less from formal and regimented party 
structures. In consequence, it has to be analyzed and countered as a social 
phenomenon that emerges both organically and strategically in the ecosystems of 
social media. This presents open societies with a dilemma: The dynamics of digital 
fascism develop out of structures that warrant freedom of expression – and to break 
these dynamics, restrictions that harm its liberal principles appear necessary. 
Keywords digitalization, far right, fascism, hate cultures, internet, social media  
 
 
1. The Paradox of Tolerance Reloaded: An Introduction 
Web 2.0 and social media have evolved as central factors of political change: for better and 
for worse. While the internet was envisioned as a tool for broadening the freedom of 
expression in the 1990s, it has since turned into a terrain for the far right to undermine open 
societies. Ever since the advent of the virtual sphere, far-right actors were adopters of digital 
technologies, yet their impact was marginal. With the proliferation of interactive social 
media, however, they have entered a new phase of mobilization, using the extended freedom 
of expression to spread their illiberal ideas. Accordingly, assumptions have arisen in political 
Digital Fascism 
      
2 
and academic discourse that the digital sphere has become an opportunity structure that 
benefits the far right in particular (Daniels 2009; Tönsberg/Walström 2017). 
In the most drastic interpretation, the argument has been put forward that the internet has 
enabled the emergence of a "digital fascism" in which the masses are the engine of their own 
manipulation (Acker 2018). This interpretation implies that social media has created new 
orders of perception in which liberal perspectives are superseded and authoritarian 
perspectives receive a boost (Turner 2019). If this power asymmetry of perspectives in online 
spaces is (at least partially) true, what does this mean for the persistence of open societies in 
times of social media? To discuss this question, we approach it in two steps. 
First, we put the "palingenetic ultranationalism" (Griffin 1991) that today rakes electoral 
success all around the globe in the context of a digitalized world. In line with prominent 
theories of fascism, we identify this rationale as the core feature of fascist phenomena: the 
perception of an endangered community that needs to be reborn through extraordinary means. 
From here, the question arises as to how such fears that justify authoritarian or illiberal 
politics unfold in the digital context. After all, if we consider them constitutive for fascism – 
Roger Griffin calls it the "fascist minimum" – understanding how myths of menace spread 
specifically under digital conditions becomes essential for the concept of digital fascism. 
Second, in line with our focus on the core feature of fascism, we relate the strategies far-
right actors employ for disseminating fears to elements of social media that potentially 
function as catalysts for such fears. In this way, we contrast aspects of agency and structure 
in social media, enabling a more substantiated understanding of how digital fascism works. 
From this tentative overview, we conclude that elements of social media not only blend into 
the interests of far-right actors, but stimulate perceptions of imperilment that are prone to 
fascism. Accordingly, digital fascism should be understood less as an organized phenomenon 
than as an emergent one, resulting from perceptions stimulated by the structures of social 
media. 
Following, we discuss why such a variation of fascism entails new challenges for the 
open society. As an emergent phenomenon, digital fascism differs significantly from classical 
fascism in organizational terms, making a new understanding of who or what has to be 
countered necessary. Its dynamics resemble a "new tribalism" (Kaplan/Costa 2014) that is 
bound together by fears produced and shared in virtual networks and less guided by formal 
and hierarchical organizations. This "post-organizational" (Mulhall 2018) nature makes 
digital fascism a more fluid and ambivalent movement, which cannot be fully grasped with 
actor- or ideology-centered approaches. More than ever before, fascism has to be analyzed 
(and countered) as a social phenomenon of cultural practices. 
Likewise, the open society is facing a dilemma: The dynamics of digital fascism develop 
out of structures that warrant freedom of expression – and to break these dynamics, 
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restrictions that harm its liberal principles appear necessary. This challenge – a reloaded 
"paradox of tolerance" (Popper 1995 [1945]: 602) – is even more vexing as digital fascism 
comes in as a social or emergent phenomenon. Since it is not fascist parties that are the main 
driving forces, but digital cultures prone to fascism that emerge from social media, there are 
no subjects assignable as the center of fascist dynamics. Accordingly, the paradox is not 
simply "not to tolerate the intolerant" (ibid.), but of being intolerant of (liberal) structures 
producing intolerance. 
 
2. The Fascist Minimum in Social Media: Making Sense of Digital Fascism 
To discuss the challenges of withstanding "digital fascism" (Acker 2018), we have to figure 
out what constitutes this phenomenon. We do so by relating two strands of research to each 
other. The first deals with the nature of fascism. Following generic definitions in fascism 
studies, we will identify a core feature of fascism – nominally Griffin's concept of 
"palingenetic ultranationalism" – and base our focus on perceptions of imperilment. The 
second strand is investigating the social impact of the internet. Guided by our focus, we 
consult literature that addresses the problem of perceptional changes through social media. 
Both taken together will frame our reasoning about how today's expressions of fascism are 
conditioned by a digitalized world. 
To be sure, this question is not an entirely novel one. An extensive amount of recent 
literature is dedicated to the problem of how the internet and social media are changing 
democracy (Bartlett 2018; Zuboff 2019) and how they contribute to radicalization (Baldauf 
et al. 2018; Meleagrou-Hitchens/Kaderbai 2017; Von Behr et al. 2013). The study of the far 
right in particular has entered a major challenge with the proliferation of social media and 
virtual forms of political involvement. As various features of online communication 
increasingly dominate our everyday lives, it has become a widespread notion that far-right 
actors are profiting significantly from the digital – or even "post-digital"1 – condition 
(Fielitz/Thurston 2019; Turner 2019). Certainly, the internet as a playground for the far-right 
is not just a recent phenomenon; it has offered the potential to renew fascist expressions for 
a while now (Daniels 2009). There has been groundbreaking research conducted on the 
                                                          
1 The post-digital names a technical condition that followed the so-named "digital revolution", and is 
constituted by the naturalization of pervasive and connected computing processes and outcomes in 
everyday life, such that digitality is now inextricable from the way we live while its forms, functions and 
effects are no longer necessarily perceptible. As we will not expand on this debate and more stick to the 
inter-effective relationship between fascism and the digital, we refer to the digital condition that, according 
to Felix Stalder (2018), encroaches our lives through three characteristics: the use of existing cultural 
materials for one's own production, the way in which new meaning is established as a collective endeavor, 
and the underlying role of algorithms and automated decision-making processes that reduce and give shape 
to massive volumes of data. 
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identity-building of virtual hate communities (Simi/Futrell 2010), the worldwide 
virtualization of fascist thought and action termed "cyber-fascism" (Griffin 2000), and 
"broadband terrorism" as the new face of fascism (Feldman 2009). However, the assumption 
that social media gave rise to an emergent variation of fascism that draws its dynamics 
directly out of social structures in the digital world still has to be substantiated.  
As a starting point, we take Antoine Acker's argument that the new, digitalized fascism 
is characterized by the circumstance that the masses are manipulating themselves through 
social media, and are less (mis-) guided by the propaganda techniques of hierarchical far-
right organizations (Acker 2018). This argument, which he developed with reference to the 
mass support for Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, mirrors not simply the notion that social media is 
particularly beneficial for authoritarian and illiberal mass movements. It also includes the 
supposition that fascist developments today are less a result of far-right organizations' 
strategic actions, but of new structures of communication that change society's perception 
towards a fascist rationality. So, how can this supposition be substantiated? 
 
2.1. The Rationale of Palingenetic Ultranationalism as the Core Feature of Fascism 
At first, this task requires us to clarify the term fascism. We follow Acker's use of this term, 
in awareness that he himself is quite imprecise in using it – he simply subsumes the recent 
illiberal or far-right developments under this term – and that it is a controversial one. After 
all, 'fascism' is, today, mostly used in a derogatory sense to stigmatize political adversaries, 
drawing misguiding historical parallels to recent challenges. Moreover, it has been argued 
that the term has become analytically useless as there is no consensus on its very meaning. 
Indeed, the field of fascism studies is marked by deep trenches between Marxist, ideological, 
cultural and praxeological approaches that make it difficult to extract a consensus around its 
meaning (Finchelstein 2017). Griffin tried to overcome this by offering a "consensual" 
definition of fascism as a revolutionary form of nationalism (Griffin 1998). Yet, to reduce 
fascism to ideological aspects has repeatedly been challenged, especially by scholars who 
research discourses (Wodak/Richardson 2013) and (political) cultures of fascism (Berezin 
1997; Gentile 2004; Mosse 1975) and the constituting role of (violent) practices for fascist 
community-building (Paxton 2004; Reichardt 2002).  
This considered, we favor a definition of fascism that is not actor-centered, but 
understand fascism as a social phenomenon; that is, a certain political rationality individuals 
and groups can express in matters of cultural practices. Moreover, we would like to 
distinguish between fascism as an ideal-type and family-like phenomena, thus understanding 
it as a concept whose ideal-type is composed of certain features, but can manifest in variations 
that have aberrant features. Consequently, we do not generalize the far-right as fascist per se. 
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Rather, it is critical for us which features – more or less elaborated – the far right and its 
environment are harboring or transporting that are constitutive for fascism, thus generating at 
least family-like phenomena.  
Following those parameters, Robert Paxton's generic understanding of fascism seems to 
be most reliable for us, when he deduces three features out of the history of inter-war actors 
that are unanimously regarded as fascist. While two features of this ideal-type refer to the 
top-down nature of fascism and its radical pragmatism, the primary feature is a "political 
behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or 
victimhood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity" (Paxton 2004: 218). 
Although not reducing fascism to ideological aspects as Griffin does, this feature – 
resembling a kind of political rationale – is nevertheless compatible with the semantic of 
Griffin's earlier concept of "palingenetic ultranationalism": the myth of a nation that is fading 
away and has to enforce its rebirth through extraordinary efforts (Griffin 1991). 
According to Griffin, this mobilization of populist energies for renewal should be seen 
as the "fascist minimum", which means: fascism may also have other features, but there is no 
fascism without it (Griffin 2018: 80). Bypassing the complex and extensive debate on 
defining fascism, we follow this argument and take palingenetic ultranationalism – or at least 
the rationale behind it as described by Paxton – as the core feature of fascism we want to 
focus on. From this, two (entangled) questions arise. The first asks how strategic actors 
unleash this rationale in public discourse to prepare authoritarian or illiberal developments. 
The second, in turn, asks how this unleashing works specifically under the digital condition. 
 
2.2. Justifying Illiberal Politics with Perceptions of Imperilment 
Regarding the first question, it has become almost common sense in studies of the far right 
that one major strategy of its actors is to address and inflame fears in order to justify 
extraordinary political approaches (Griffin 1991). In inter-war democracies in particular, one 
outstanding scheme of the fascist movement was to construct a national crisis in public 
discourse and to precipitate a state of emergency demanding authoritarian and illiberal 
measures (Mosse 1975). This also has to be seen in the context of the third feature Paxton 
attributes to fascism: a radical pragmatism that feels unbound to "ethical or legal restraints" 
to enforce the actors' goals (Paxton 2004: 16). This pragmatism also includes a highly 
instrumental relation to truth, which can be bent if it helps to construct the preconditions for 
seizing influence and power (Billig 1978: 67). 
Strikingly, today it is still a predominant scheme of the far right to adopt "politics by 
fear" (Wodak 2015; Bonikowski 2017) or to set "anxious politics" (Albertson/Gadarian 2015) 
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into motion. Some actors attributed to the far right even admit this. For instance, Donald 
Trump claimed in his presidential campaign that "real power [comes from] fear" (Woodward 
2018). What this means in concrete terms can be seen in narratives the global far right is 
spreading in the context of migration issues. In manifold ways national actors utter the myth 
that the respective nation is victim of a "great replacement", as the attacker of Christchurch 
put it, inspired by a standard trope of European Identitarianism (Zuquete 2018). Similarly, 
the German far right speaks of a "population exchange" (Umvolkung) or even "people's death" 
(Volkstod) (Quent 2014), as well as North American supremacists tell stories of "white 
genocide" (Perry 2004) to justify radical action.  
Such extinction narratives are not limited to militants of the far right, but find their way 
– at least in gradations – into the broader public. This is, for instance, reflected in German 
discourse where the talk of "anxious citizens" went viral in the context of anti-migration 
protests, normalizing the far-right myth of a menace (Marcks 2016). It is not a coincidence 
that in the wake of this discursive shift, which made xenophobia more mainstream, attacks 
on refugees in Germany exploded (Quent et al. 2019). Correspondingly, Susan Benesch has 
made the more general point that an (imagined) "mortal threat from a disfavored or minority 
group makes violence seem not just acceptable, but necessary" (Benesch 2018). From this 
perspective, it is "dangerous speech" that forgoes expressions of hate and should thus be 
considered as more essential for fascist dynamics than the often adduced "hate speech" (ibid.). 
This points to dialectics that already loomed in the accounts of Paxton and Griffin when 
they pointed to the compensatory aspect in the fascist rationale: out of perceptions of 
imperilment the justification derives for behaving in an uncompromising way. To put it 
bluntly, facing death, all means are allowed, if not necessary. This conversion from 
victimhood to perpetration is the same rationality appearing in the peculiar mixture of 
mournful suppression and propagating superiority that can be observed in the far right today 
(Fielitz et al. 2018: 24). Seemingly a contradiction, the interplay of both is actually at the 
heart of fascist dynamics. After all, it is the passion to fight for the endangered community 
that mobilizes people to join the fascist movement. And this mobilization brings people 
together who, in turn, reinforce each other in their perceptions of imperilment (cf. Paxton 
2004: 36). 
However, while the core feature of fascism is alive and well, the role of far-right 
organizations in unleashing it seems to have changed. According to Paxton's second feature, 
in classical fascism a "mass-based party of committed nationalist militants" (ibid.: 218) – 
usually a strong hierarchical one (Rosenberg 2012) – was crucial for guiding this process, by 
spreading manipulative propaganda and by organizing practices in which these passions 
could unfold. Of course, there are still far-right actors functioning this way – the Golden 
Dawn in Greece or the Slovakian L'SNS are cases in point. Yet, we see that large numbers of 
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far-right extremists in the U.S., for instance, have left organized groups to avoid social 
stigmatization and align with peers in online forums. According to Mark Potok, "[m]any of 
those people apparently now belong to no group, but operate instead mainly on the internet, 
where they can offer their opinions anonymously and easily find others who agree with them 
– and where they can be heard by huge numbers of people without the hassles, dues, and poor 
leadership associated with membership in most groups" (Potok in: Neiwert 2017: 36-37). 
Hence, the digital sphere offered a much-needed substitute to the failing real-life experience. 
It is thus no coincidence that, according to Rob May and Matthew Feldman, fascist 
ideology today has been most successfully rebranded by the Alt-Right, a digitally born 
movement that is marked by a lack of ideological cohesion, leadership and organization 
(May/Feldman 2019: 25). The broader dissemination of far-right tropes in online spaces 
followed the promotion of a more horizontal approach to activism that conflated with online 
subcultures. The resulting Alt-Right and its various global relatives significantly differ from 
interwar fascism, not only in matters of organizational structures, but also in the way they 
strategically permeate society with their ideas. And this leads to the second question as to 
how exactly this is conditioned by digitalization. 
 
2.3. Catalyzing Perceptions of Imperilment through Social Media 
In the digital age, we need to rethink how social interactions work – mass manipulation in 
particular. Digital platforms have become a central marketplace for ideas, commerce and 
conflict, profoundly changing collective action (Bennett/Segerberg 2013), as studies of social 
movements have also shown (Earl/Kimport 2011; Tufekci 2017). They have enhanced the 
network capabilities of actors, their cross-sector mobilization reach and their speed of 
transnational exchange (Margetts et at. 2016). All this comes along with new forms of 
political claim-making that transcend any clear distinction between online and offline politics. 
For instance, it has been said that actors increasingly adjust their behavior to the functioning 
of online platforms (Gillespie 2010), mimicking "the logic of companies such as Facebook 
and Amazon and integrating the data-driven logic of social networks in [their] very decision-
making structure" (Gerbaudo 2018: 5).  
These transitions have not simply changed the face of the very far right, but also of its 
environment, that is, its constituency and audience. While already in the pre-digital age, the 
far right has proclaimed "leaderless resistance" as a strategic advancement (Kaplan 1999), 
this paradigm somehow became (even more) real with far-right online cultures. Today, the 
movement expresses itself more strongly as a virtual community in which the boundaries 
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between organized activists and individual supporters are blurred.2 In these networked social 
movements – some call them "post-organizational" (Donovan 2018) – it is hard to tell what 
and who is organized or not. They fundamentally question our understanding of individual 
and collective action, since all subjects in these networks are in direct contact with one 
another. On the other hand, however, far-right actors are involved in efforts of "leading the 
leaderless" (Tufekci 2017: 49–82), by implanting guidance and channeling the seemingly 
dispersed hate that floods different levels of social media. In consequence, members of those 
"digital hate cultures" may not even be aware that they are part of fascist dynamics (Ganesh 
2018).  
The puzzle lies thus in understanding how far these dynamics today are driven by 
strategic actors on social media or are the result of emergent processes. While it became 
obvious that the far right is roaming and burgeoning on social media (Ebner/Davey 2017), it 
is far from clear how exactly it benefits from the digital opportunities. At the same time, 
however, there are indications that perceptions of imperilment are catalyzed through 
digitalization (cf. Homer-Dixon 2004): precisely the emotions the "fascist minimum" is 
building on. The explanations for this may differ; but they center definitely around the 
problem that the allocation and selection of information have changed drastically in times of 
social media. Furthermore, it has been said that social media caused an erosion in the 
intersubjective understanding of truth, thus extending the space for "post-truth". And this 
circumstance seems to fit, again, the radical pragmatism of fascism that deals with truth in a 
highly instrumental fashion (Finchelstein 2016). 
This is where our analysis sets off. It tries to test Acker's argument that digital fascism 
has to been seen more as an emergent phenomenon resulting from perceptual changes through 
social media – and less as a result of strategic action by fascist parties. The argument is 
provocative, but not implausible. As we have theorized, myths of menace are the fuel for 
fascist dynamics; and in classical fascism it was the function of the party to unleash such 
perceptions of imperilment among the masses. In times of social media, however, the digital 
structures of the masses may produce new orders of perception prone to fascism, this way 
making fascist parties as driving forces (partially) obsolete. To identify what are strategic and 
what are emergent factors, we will now take a closer look at how far-right agency unfolds in 
the structures of social media. This is critical for the question as to whether it actually makes 
sense to speak of digital fascism. 
 
                                                          
2 To be sure, 'virtual' does not necessarily mean 'digital'. Already in the pre-digital age, virtual alliances 
formed, for instance, when lone wolves joined a movement unilaterally and without formal bounds by 
perpetrating acts on its behalf and being recognized as functional part of it by movement entrepreneurs 
and/or the public (see Marcks 2019). 
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3. Far-Right Strategies and Digital Cultures: How Digital Fascism Works 
Far-right actors have been at the forefront in using digital means to convey their political 
message and to socialize a new generation of disciples. The internet's forums, communities 
and websites provide an ideal breeding ground for a new tech-savvy generation which soon 
hived off the standard tropes of nationalism and racism, making them applicable to a much 
broader audience. Yet, we cannot solely understand this rebranding as a top-down process. 
As an ever more globalizing movement, the far right builds on very specific language and 
cultural settings that cannot be simply channeled and directed by parties or organized groups. 
Rather, dispersed digital (sub-)cultures create new counter-publics that go far beyond the 
familiar logic of far-right organizations (Wendling 2018). They strongly correspond with the 
fear-mongering that is being reproduced by a patchwork of beliefs in which contradictory 
influences converge into myths of an endangered community that is forced to take radical 
action (Törnberg/Wallström 2017: 24).  
The narratives of victimhood and imperilment are key to understanding the enhanced 
mobilization of such emotions. These myths of menace are easily compatible with the cultural 
pessimism that permeates mainstream and radical right-wing ideologies. Therefore, it is 
crucial to analyze how they diffuse in the digital infrastructures that connect the more 
organized forms of the far right with the dispersed potential of fascist dynamics. In doing so, 
we distinguish between three general readings guiding the analysis. First, it has to be asked 
whether social media represents a general opportunity structure that far-right actors are now 
utilizing very effectively. Second, it makes sense to consider whether social media even offers 
a special opportunity structure that corresponds advantageously with far-right agency. Third, 
we look at whether social media itself produces new orders of perception that are prone to 
the fascist rationale. These aspects mark the extent to which fascist dynamics in the digital 
context are a consequence of strategic actions or of emergent processes.  
 
3.1. Dramatic Storytelling and the Amplification of Fears 
Nationally and transnationally, it has been a prominent pattern of far-right actors to feature 
local events and topical issues in order to spin dramatic narratives that serve a far-right 
agenda. In fact, the far right has built up an alternative news system that is specialized in 
storytelling techniques (Lewis 2018). These techniques encourage the consumer to identify 
with the victims of crimes that are being associated with, for instance, migrants and Muslims. 
Selectively emphasizing facts and rumors that support justifying certain politics has been 
termed 'frame amplification': "the clarification and invigoration of an interpretive frame that 
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bears on a particular issue, problem, or set of events" (Snow et al. 1986: 469). It is obvious 
that far-right actors amplify messages and news that trigger fear and notions of threat.  
On the German far right, for instance, the figure of the 'molesting foreigner' is of central 
importance and has been associated with incoming migrants and Muslims living in Germany 
(Amadeu Antonio Foundation 2017). In this context, specific local events are given 
transregional and even transnational meaning. For instance, the tragic incident of a young girl 
being stabbed by an unaccompanied minor refugee in Kandel has made the small town a 
symbol of resistance against migration and 'Islamization' (Berg 2019). As the slogan "Kandel 
is everywhere" indicates, far-right actors try to generalize such events, suggesting a kind of 
ongoing femicide of German women by migrants. Similarly, local incidents of (lethal) 
violence involving migrants are featured regularly in the far right's national news system, 
crystallized even in websites mapping incidents they relate to a "migration of knives". 
These campaigns come along with a personalization and moralization of critique that is 
seemingly sketched to blur the difference between abstract structures and concrete events 
(Salzborn 2017: 123). For instance, German chancellor Angela Merkel is repeatedly blamed 
for crimes that are allegedly committed by migrants. Tapered in the uniting parole "Merkel 
must go", an aggressive affectivity is cultivated that is constantly associated with events and 
developments that promote a far-right agenda. It is another facet of these discourses that far-
right parties, movements and online subcultures present themselves as victims of political 
correctness and larger conspiracies that prevent them from effectively protecting their 
endangered community. Establishing alternative influence networks has, thus, a stronger 
countercultural appeal (Lewis 2018). 
Undoubtedly, far-right actors know how to use social media strategically for their 
agenda. By creating trans-local identification with victims of local incidents they spread the 
notion of a nation permanently under attack. Their messaging is particularly constructed to 
encourage people to identify with the characters in their stories. 'It could happen to you' is a 
central message when they, for instance, call on women to weaponize to defend themselves. 
Suggesting that nothing is safe anymore, actors call for vigilantism and exclusion while their 
online disciples produce deeply racist messages and memes, unleashing perceptions of 
imperilment and laying the ground for justification of extraordinary politics to save and 
strengthen their own communities. Storytelling has thus evolved to become the order of the 
day. Wrapping political messages in seemingly casual comments, video clips and memes 
have become central weapons of an 'information war' that aims at subverting liberal values 
(Marwick/Lewis 2018). Employing largely plain-sight activists, they incite hordes of 
(supposed) trolls in the infamous forums to amplify their messages. 
The structures of social media are especially beneficial for such an agenda, if not one of 
its motors. It has been found that bad news posts and links are more likely to spread virally 
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through the digital spheres (Soroka et al. 2015). This is partly conditioned through the 
functioning of social media itself: Via social media platforms, people feel connected with 
events that happen in very different contexts. Since the information density is so high, news 
that people can associate with gets more attention. Moreover, this corresponds with insights 
that dramatic events are usually more salient in human perception (cf. Trussler/Soroka 2014). 
With the "glocalization" of information in the digital age that allows bad news previously 
constrained to local audiences to spread globally, perceptions of imperilment are also 
amplified by social media itself, this way producing a stronger discrepancy between actual 
and perceived dangers (cf. Dietrich/Haußecker 2017). 
 
3.2. Gaslighting and the Diffusion of Post-Truth 
Gaslighting is a technique that is key to understanding the rationale of digital fascism in its 
propensity towards affective politics. It describes a manipulating practice that causes 
disorientation and uncertainty about one's sense of reality. As we have seen, frame 
amplification is a key technique employed by the far right to influence public opinion by 
emphasizing specific news stories and interpretations and by constructing the identity of a 
collective victimhood. The gaslighting approach goes one step further. It stokes the idea that 
there is no truth, but only 'postfactual' emotions "to anchor in a dense fog of rumors 
nationalistic, racist and anti-Semitic worldviews and thereby to instrumentalize the 
democratic media" (Salzborn 2017: 16). 
The most obvious means of gaslighting is to spread manipulated news that causes 
confusion. 'Fake news' or 'alternative facts' are well-known expressions of such efforts to 
misinform the public. Besides such blatant lies, which are often uncovered by other media 
actors, but nevertheless get caught up in public discourse and individual perceptions, it is the 
framing of topics, language and interpretations that set the tone. The rhetoric on migration-
related issues, for instance, gives us a central glimpse of this problem: Combined with flawed 
numbers and charts, the migration of people has been associated with natural disasters that 
topple the state of normality; floods, waves and hurricanes are central tropes that convey a 
message of invading forces and trigger feelings of being abandoned by the state. As a 
consequence of this confusion, the far right brings such emotions to boil by predicting an 
inevitable conflict (or even civil war) between 'civilizations'.  
Such processes are possible because, with digitalization and social media, the traditional 
gatekeepers of public discourse have lost control over the allocation of information. Initially, 
Web 2.0. enabled people who would otherwise have been contained to tiny audiences due to 
their incapacity to find publishers or enter media stages, to present themselves to the world 
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with minimal web skills and resources. Social media, in turn, goes further. It offers every 
individual a dirt-cheap service structure to spread content effectively, ready-made and not 
demanding any skill. Even the access to an audience is included in this service, even for 
individuals who provide nothing more than a dull commentary that would formerly have 
failed to qualify as a reader's letter. All this not only accounts for political actors, but also for 
clueless individuals. As "prosumers" they not only consume (manipulative) information, but 
(re-)produce it by sharing it uncritically if they lack the expertise to classify the information 
at hand properly. 
The far right is a major profiteer of this opening up of plural information. Classical 
fascism was already gaslighting successfully by using new media for spreading manipulative 
information. As a response, the open societies developed protection mechanisms against this, 
such as journalistic or ethical standards for knowledge production, disarming the far right, 
whose agenda stands and falls with society's susceptibility to making truth random. Social 
media levers these mechanisms out, thus giving the far right its most important weapon back 
to unleash alternative perceptions. Bypassing established routines and institutions of 
knowledge production, it can easily spread its manipulative content. As Jessie Daniels writes, 
"the rise of the Alt-Right would not be possible without the infrastructure built by the tech 
industry, and yet, the industry likes to imagine itself as creating a "race-less internet" (Daniels 
2018: 62). 
That structures of social media are also immanently beneficial for the far right is due to 
its instrumental relation to truth. While other political actors are bound to ethical constraints 
in dealing with information, in the fascist rationale there are basically no limits that would 
sacrifice political ambition for the sake of the factuality of events. Leaders of the Identitarian 
Movement, for instance, admit openly, that "[w]e need a moral justification of our position 
much more urgently than proof of its factual correctness!" (Sellner 2017: 218). And this need 
is also satisfied by social media itself, as it contributes to an erosion in the intersubjective 
understanding of truth and thus to an "epistemic crisis" (Benkler et al. 2018: 3). As mentioned 
above, dramatic events are more salient in human perception, and, at the same time, offensive 
material attracts more attention. Fear-mongering content is hence only more likely to migrate 
from one platform to the next. Promising more clickbait (and revenues), it also gets prioritized 
in the algorithm-based curation of users. In this way, social media keeps pushing the diffusion 
of "post-truth" forward, which the fascist rationale then builds on. 
 
3.3. Metric Manipulation and the Logic of Numbers 
Taking the techniques described above a step further, we can observe a symbiosis of far-right 
manipulation strategies with a business-like competitiveness over followers and attention. 
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Range and ratings are today a central engine to produce visibility and ultimately political 
efficacy, since voices from social media outlets are increasingly seen as a truthful mirror of 
public opinion. Furthermore, even mainstream media takes snippets to reflect public opinion 
and to feature trends in social media. For instance, trending hashtags on Twitter may gain the 
attention of the broader public and allow the message transfer between different platforms. It 
should thus not be surprising that far-right actors, with their radical pragmatism, are engaged 
in metric manipulation: they try to create better ranges or ratings and to outnumber political 
opponents and undesirable content. 
The potential of this technique has been seized by an alliance of far-right actors and 
trolling cultures that are keen to disrupt a democratic discourse (Tuters 2019). In an attempt 
to make truth random and to marginalize opposing ideas, far-right actors make use of numbers 
of fake accounts, automated bots and flawed algorithms, while being generally in favor of 
intense online activism. In this way, only a small minority of social media users produces 
vast amounts of content, giving the impression of an emboldened community (Kreißel et al. 
2018). Such efforts at metric manipulation not only serve to gain broader media attention, but 
also to persuade individuals that their community is endangered. By making a viewpoint 
appear to be supported by a majority, far-right actors can credibly contend that politicians 
and mainstream media are concealing the imperilment, suggesting a conspiracy against the 
will and the interests of the people. 
In the German-speaking context, the technique has been further elaborated by a far-right 
network called Reconquista Germanica (Bogerts/Fielitz 2019). Several thousand far-right 
activists and self-considered trolls gathered on an encrypted discussion board to coordinate 
manipulation efforts that worked in favor of the AfD party. On central command, hordes of 
far-right activists targeted the mainstream discussion boards in social media in the disguise 
of anonymity. Besides these methods of outnumbering, they were also involved in hijacking 
hashtags and the harassment of politicians, including the doxing of personal information that 
had already led to the withdrawal of representatives from politics. Organizations like the 
Identitarians and the AfD have welcomed the flood of comments, memes and bots to 
marginalize opponents and to manipulate discourses. They also encourage online activists to 
bring discord into discussions and challenge opponents with disruptive tactics and 
transgressive appearances. Trolling as a tactic in particular reflects the ambivalence of the 
internet (Philips 2018). Double meanings, in-joke humor, irony and invective build the 
cornerstones of a subtle practice, where activists hide behind fake profiles to sidetrack, 
frustrate or (in the best case) neutralize critics, contributing to a discursive metric that makes 
far-right tropes look common.  
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Influencing the discursive metric is also a matter of speed since rapidly-shared content 
catches above-average attention and promises exponential dispersal. The coordinated actions 
of online activists pushing content are thus important for metric manipulation. Moreover, the 
far right accelerated its influence by relying heavily on image-based communication. In 
contrast to textual forms, visual forms of political messages enjoy greater trust as they affect 
emotions and forge a relationship between the spectator, the image and the sender. Memes 
are a central weapon in this "war of information". The sheer mass of these image-text 
combinations – produced in the depths of the vernacular web and combined with the 
propensity towards trolling – is aimed at giving public discourse a certain spin. As Luke Munn 
writes: "If automated speed was key to social media, memetic speed is critical here. There is 
no time for discourse in the sense of a considered exchange of ideas. The picture and slogan 
that gets pasted more, that floods the board, that soaks up more scroll time, wins" (Munn 
2019). 
Social media gave thus the far right a special opportunity. With activists and bots, it can 
influence the discursive metric as never before. The anonymity of the internet allows subjects 
to multiply themselves with numerous fake accounts; at once, content can be easily 
reproduced by copy-and-paste or even automatic procedures. Here, as with gaslighting, the 
far right, with its radical pragmatism, has an immanent leg-up on other political actors whose 
ethics are at odds with manipulation and thus with taking part in a kind of online arms race. 
Moreover, the logic of numbers, which already applied to pre-digital movements, gets a new 
spin with social media: echo chambers constitute discursive spaces that are homogenous, this 
way reinforcing impressions that a certain popular content is uncontested; while quick 
resonances to content give them priority in terms of visibility, marginalizing other content 
quickly in the contest for numbers. It stands to reason that, under these conditions, emotional 
and simplified content outweighs arguments and reasoning, making perceptions of reality that 
are prone to the fascist rationale more likely. 
 
4. Grasping the Intangible: The Fluidity and Ambivalence of Digital Fascism 
Relating far-right agency in social media to structures of social media, the above section has 
shown that Acker's argument has a plausible core. Social media does not simply offer 
opportunities for far-right actors to spread their worldviews, but offers opportunity structures 
that are particularly beneficial for far-right agency. Moreover, social media itself (re-
)produces orders of perception that are prone to the fascist rationale. This is plausible if we 
understand palingenetic ultranationalism as the core feature of fascism and corresponding 
myths of menace as constitutive for fascist dynamics. After all, social media enables an 
allocation and selection of information that unleashes perceptions of imperilment in 
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particular, thus doing the emotional work that, in classical fascism, had to be done by a 
regimented party structure. 
Digital fascism can thus be considered a family-like variation of fascism in which the 
fascist core feature draws dynamics directly out of social structures in the digital world. This 
means that the propaganda strategies of single far-right parties and movements that once 
worked as motors for unleashing it may today have a pushing rather than a driving role. 
Seeing such a digital fascism rising, it is now up for debate what such a variation of fascism 
means for the persistence of open societies. As a more emergent phenomenon, digital fascism 
differs significantly from classical fascism in organizational terms, thus making adjustments 
in the dealing with fascist dynamics necessary. This is a particular challenge because digital 
fascism is highly fluid and ambivalent, lacking a clear organizational center that can serve as 
a focal point for counter-efforts. The political opponent is, thus, an intangible one, leaving 
civil society actors confused about how to approach the phenomenon and how to pinpoint 
who or what exactly has to be countered. 
 
4.1. Fluid Transitions between Activists and Audience 
The most obvious aspect of the new face of fascism is the contrast to the highly centralist way 
of organizing in classical fascism (Rosenberg 2012), exhibiting a historically uncommon 
extent of decentralization. Most prominently, this is expressed by the swarm-like penetration 
of online discussion boards that undermines the openness of debate, equal access to it and 
finally the accessibility of public opinion. This kind of leaderless swarm activity spreads 
messages and contributes to dynamics that are neither centrally controlled nor in any way 
controllable or governable (Ganesh 2018). In particular, the growing subcultural collectives 
that act out in discussion boards and chat forums follow their own trolling logic of 
schadenfreude that may cause repercussions differing from the strategic logic of formal far-
right parties and groups (Coleman 2014; Philips 2015). 
It would fall too short to see this just as a loss of control for authority in the movement, 
giving grassroots activism more space in the far right. The problem is much deeper because 
it goes along with new mechanisms of mobilizing and recruiting, making it difficult to 
distinguish between activists, constituency and even audiences. In short: the movement 
constitutes itself very differently, integrating individuals effectively into virtual networks that 
feel solicited by the appeal to a leaderless, dispersed digital resistance that is tailored to the 
needs of online activism. Leadership certainly still plays an important role in the digital 
spheres of far-right activism. In virtual networks, there is still space for authority that can 
work as a "virtual leadership" (cf. Holtmann 2011). For instance, we see the rising impact of 
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far-right influencers that transport quite different messages and correspond to individualizing 
tendencies in the digital sphere. However, the operative influence is less formalized and thus 
often hidden. "Leading the leaderless" (Tufekci 2017) is a much more indirect process, since 
the membership is not so much following orders, but rather emotions are triggering people to 
act. The job of a digital far-right leader is thus to push the right buttons on social media to 
make this emotional machine work for them. 
The new relationship of far-right leaders to the movement makes it hard to grasp the 
cradle of fascist dynamics, since the fluidity of these virtual networks does not allow a clear 
classification of how individuals and groups relate to each other. This problem can be 
explained by the concept of cooperation. Traditionally, when individuals join an organization, 
they access a cooperative relationship in the sense that a bilateral agreement takes place, 
enabling coordinated action. In contrast, where individuals act unilaterally in the interest or 
even on behalf of someone, but in an uncoordinated way, this is a case of "harmony" 
(Keohane 1984). Recent far-right networks, however, transcend this classification. While it 
is true that individuals affiliate with virtual networks unilaterally, it is not correct to say that 
there is no coordination. On the one hand, there is virtual leadership (although the individuals 
may not be aware of it); and on the other hand, they are coordinated by social media itself. 
After all, social media puts people into a direct relationship with each other, offering a 
structural environment for mutual references and a hidden guidance through the algorithm-
based curation of interaction. Social media has thus become a form of hyper-organization – 
a network for networks – where quasi-cooperative processes are simulated in varying spaces 
(Lovink/Rossiter 2018). The access to these spaces are identities and emotions that designate 
the mutual references and interactions. The patterns of such (seemingly) leaderless activism 
can be seen as a result of discursive dynamics in political conflicts, in which "imagined 
communities" function as indentation for interrelating individuals with specific virtual 
networks (cf. Joosse 2015). Accordingly, it is ideational and symbolic channels that activate 
and guide individuals, often motivated by the aspiration "to become part of a cohesive and 
supportive milieu" (ibid.: 3). This reflects the desire to belong to a group system outside the 
real surrounding social structures that has been termed "new tribalism" (see Kaplan/Costa 
2013). It is clear that the existence of social media has facilitated the opportunities to satisfy 
this desire, which may also be stronger today since the fragmentation of modern society leads 
to unstable identities. In this sense, members of the virtual networks of the far right are often 
idiosyncratic. Not at home in political debates and not having been active in political groups, 
they combine their own ideas with the ideological pieces they find fitting. Consequently, it is 
hard to tell what are authentic expressions of the far-right actors and what are manifestations 
of free-riding. 
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4.2. Ambivalent Expressions in Digital Cultures 
Due to its dynamic nature and low barriers for participation, virtual networks on social media 
create specific synergy effects and group processes in the form of digital hate cultures 
behaving like swarms (Ganesh 2018). Members of such swarms are often not aware that they 
are part of a broader dynamic or agenda. On the one hand, the boundaries between everyday 
expressions of opinions and political propaganda are blurred. On the other hand, the members 
are not simply consuming information, but also take part in the production of information, by 
liking, sharing or commenting on content, thereby potentially functioning as multipliers of 
fascist dynamics. Both aspects can be perfectly exemplified by memes: Born in humoristic 
and ironic image-boards, they are charged with far-right messages that are difficult to 
decipher, or are so ambivalent that it is futile to try to distinguish between provocation and 
agitation (Philips 2018; Bogerts/Fielitz 2019). Clueless subjects can thus rapidly reproduce 
far-right messages in the accelerated speed of meme dissemination. 
Digital fascism is hardly tangible due its "post-organizational" characteristics that make 
the phenomenon highly fluid and ambivalent. This is reflected in the way the internet has 
revolutionized organizational processes. Organizing without the need for organizations, as 
Clay Shirky described the collective action paradox in the digital age, had deep repercussions 
on political mobilization (Shirky 2008). Furthermore, it is not so much ideological 
consistency that keeps this assemblage of idiosyncratic elements together, but rather the 
cultural practices in the digital community itself that work in a community-building way. 
Engaging in those digital cultures through offensive rhetoric and transgressive behaviors is 
thus the meaningful means for a collective identity. This fits well with Sven Reichardt's 
comment that, for fascism, means are more important than the ends; in this sense, political 
style and practice are (also) constitutive for the movement (Reichardt 2002). Today, this 
praxeological moment, which is also recognized by Robert Paxton (2004), is still as alive as 
the fascist core feature, however, like palingenetic ultranationalism, the necessary practices 
are less dependent on a party that mobilizes for action in the streets. The virtual networks are 
already a permanent mobilization that center around emotions which are easy to trigger on 
social media. 
Far-right actors are well aware of the join-in character that digital cultures offer and 
assume that their ambivalence will work for their cause. In an interview, Martin Sellner, the 
Austrian leader of the Identitarians, for instance, praised their dynamics as contributing to the 
agenda of the far right: "I just see in [the internet] a hurricane, a chaos potential of irony, 
partly also hate and anger. At the same time, however, there are pubertal feelings that have 
become immune to any moral dogma. In my opinion, this hurricane, this tornado, will 
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massively damage and blow up political correctness."3 It is this emotional dynamic that far-
right actors try to use as a carrier to gradually conflate digital cultures with far-right 
undertones, realizing the metapolitics the New Right imagined: a subtle form of politics that 
subverts the cultural foundations of political discourse (Griffin 2000). This conflation is 
precisely what makes digital fascism so challenging, since its core feature unfolds in the wake 
of pubertal feelings whose effervescence make it seem naive, at best brattish and thus 
politically negligible.  
 
4.3. Immanent Challenges for Open Societies  
With digital fascism, so one could say, fascism comes closer to its core. No longer exclusively 
dependent on a hierarchical party as the driver of fear-mongering and mobilizing practices, 
fascism draws new dynamics directly out of emotions and cultural practices that are spawned 
by and in the structures of social media. Such a phenomenon cannot be grasped with actor- 
or ideology-centered approaches. More than ever before, fascism has to be analyzed as an 
emergent phenomenon through the actions of its disciples. In the same vein, it has to be 
countered as such. And this means: In the absence of a tangible center of political actors, it is 
primarily the structures that constitute its dynamics that have to be targeted.  
Recently, the dominant counter-efforts against fascist dynamics are, however, located at 
the agency level. Civil society responds, for instance, with its own agendas of online politics 
and activism. This is reflected in numerous programs and trainings to intervene in far-right 
storytelling, particularly with methods of counter-narratives intended to compete with the far 
right for the audience and/or to persuade its constituency of other perspectives. An evaluation 
of this 'digital street work' is still outstanding, but one can plausibly assume that it requires a 
profound knowledge of the emotional, strategic and structural dimensions of the problem to 
design them effectively. After all, fascist dynamics rest on a fluidity and ambivalence that 
make contradicting effects of ill-considered interventions likely. Moreover, this knowledge 
has to be applied consistently by a broad alliance, if – in a minefield of trolls – no backfire 
effects are to outweigh the positive effects.  
However, even in the most organized way, the friends of the open society, as Karl Popper 
describes them, are at a disadvantage compared to their enemies. The functioning of social 
media has created a power asymmetry of perspectives in online spaces since it stimulates 
orders of perception that are prone to the fascist rationale. It is an immanent problem that 
liberal and progressive actors cannot compensate for this asymmetry without adjusting to the 
fascist rationale. To participate in an online arms race would mean to take over manipulative 
                                                          
3 Martin Sellner: Hass für den Infokrieg im Netz | Doku Lösch-Dich Bonus. Online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TsWXwS5qjRk, quote at 11:55. 
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techniques and thus to betray the ideas of enlightenment. It thus demands external solutions 
to change the ecosystem that this competition takes place in. This does not necessitate a 
shutdown of the internet – which would be an authoritarian approach itself – but apposite 
modifications in the macro- and micro-structures of social media. To do this, it has to be 
understood how single techniques of the far right interact with each other and with the 
structural environment, to design modifications that lever out the synergy effects of far-right 
agency in social media. 
 
5. Being Intolerant (of Structures) of Intolerance? Conclusive Considerations  
"Fascism can come back under the most innocent of disguises", wrote Umberto Eco in his 
manuscript on Ur-Fascism (Eco 1995). And in fact, today it lurks in the hidden spaces that 
we have limited access to and it finds, in pervasive steps, its way to the surface in the guise 
of practices in digital cultures (cf. Fekete 2018). It is undeniable that the internet is one of the 
most sweeping spaces that gave fascism a new impetus: from the Alt-Right to the 
Identitarians, from 'shitposting' to manipulation tactics. It is a hybrid form of fascism that 
transgresses traditional models of politics and is wrapped up by digital subcultures that 
increasingly influence mainstream platforms where millions of users spend time socializing, 
informing and exchanging. 
With the pervasion of digital fascism, the open society is facing a dilemma. This dilemma 
is basically the same liberal and progressive actors are always confronted with when it comes 
to facing fascism. Popper once called it the "paradox of tolerance", referring to the duty "to 
not tolerate the intolerant", that is, to deny certain liberal privileges to the enemies of the open 
society (Popper 1995 [1945]: 602). This duty is paradoxical because it forces liberal actors to 
act (at least partially) against their own liberal principles. Today, this paradox becomes even 
more tricky, since digital fascism comes in as a more social or emergent phenomenon. If it is 
less a matter of fascist parties that are unleashing perceptions of imperilment to justify 
authoritarian politics, but more a matter of digital (hate) cultures emerging from social media, 
then fascist dynamics cannot simply be countered by focusing on intolerant actors. Instead, 
liberal intolerance has to be directed against the structures producing orders of perception 
prone to the fascist rationale. 
As we have outlined in this paper, the mutual production and amplification of fear is the 
central transmission belt between the structural conditions of social media and the inherent 
logic of fascism. The new face of fascism in the digital age is thus ephemeral and builds 
virtual alliances and mutual entanglements between broader online subcultures and organized 
forms of activism. In this way, the digital conditions have strongly affected both far-right 
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authoritarianism and the resistance to it, recasting the role of formal organizations and 
grounding a new form of decentralized activism that switches interchangeably between online 
and offline. With the virtual structures of social media, it is almost impossible to assign certain 
consequences to specific subjects' actions. Due to the absence of a tangible center of political 
actors driving the fascist dynamics, it is not clear who should be made responsible and 
targeted.  
Accordingly, there is a tendency in public debates to depoliticize the problems of fascist 
dynamics by taking the digital conditions as a new, second nature of modern society. The 
algorithm-based curation of users as well as the freedom of anonymity are taken for granted 
by many people. In contrast, however, there are also efforts to assign responsibility to those 
who create the fundamental algorithms and provide the structures beneficial for fascist 
dynamics. This tendency to center responsibility again is expressed in critiques from civil 
society of the role of social media companies and political demands to regulate or even disrupt 
them. In this matter, first measures have already been taken. In Germany, for instance, the 
Network Enforcement Act (Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz) was passed in 2017, placing 
providers of social media under an obligation to proceed against hate crime and other 
indictable content. This is followed by a series of international commitments by tech 
companies to take action against extremist content as a reaction to political demands, 
particularly following the terrorist act of Christchurch. 
However, it is questionable if such measures of content filtering are sufficient to break 
down fascist dynamics, given the multiple mechanisms of social media that are beneficial for 
far-right agency. On the other hand, what can be done effectively against these mechanisms 
is moot, since politics cannot simply turn back time. The geography of information, for 
instance, has changed irreversibly. While the invention of print media brought a first wave of 
informational glocalization, and TV and radio a second, this glocalization now has been 
completed with the internet. And as in the late middle-ages and later in the 20th century, where 
those waves were beneficial for perceptions of imperilment or even hysteria, society has to 
adjust to this new intensity of information as a matter of fact – and to deal with the far right's 
new capability of dramatic storytelling to amplify fears. 
Nevertheless, this capability can be limited by restricting the opportunities for 
gaslighting and metric manipulation. After all, the far right has been particularly successful 
recently because the techniques described interlock perfectly in the given environment: 
Metric manipulation helps gaslighting, and gaslighting helps amplification. Looking for 
specific interventions into the structures that allow those synergy effects should be considered 
of central importance to break down fascist dynamics. Here, it is possible to imagine measures 
that would be undoubtedly effective, such as making providers of digital platforms 
responsible for the content shared via their infrastructure or user registration systems that 
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enable fake accounts. However, such strong measures are at odds with the prevailing norms 
of freedom on the internet and may undermine liberal principles itself. Open societies have 
thus to consider carefully whether digital fascism necessitates risking their own restriction, 
or whether they should settle for a softer approach that accepts the risks of digital fascism. 
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